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Red Armed Policy Seen Like U.S.'s

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Central Intelligence Agency Director John A. McCone has been telling congressional leaders that, in effect, the Soviet Union seems to be following a military policy quite similar to that of the United States.

Every year, at the beginning of the congressional session, the CIA Director briefs committees with national security responsibilities—the Foreign Affairs, Atomic Energy, and Armed Services Committees.

This year, according to reports, he has been telling the Congressmen that the thing to watch for is major Soviet efforts to upgrade the quality of forces they now have, rather than for big increases in the size of the forces.

This, essentially, is what the Administration is recommending the United States do as well. The new defense budget proposes no additions to the long-range nuclear forces already on order, and makes clear that the one improved strategic missile version of the Polaris submarine-launched missile called the Poseidon—is intended as a replacement for Polaris missiles now in the force, rather than as an addition to the force.

Similarly, in the field of conventional forces, the Administration is continuing to spend heavily, but is proposing no increase in size.

In bomber and missile defenses, the Administration has even proposed some decreases in the size of the forces deployed. It is putting a substantial effort into research and development of an improved missile defense, but is making no commitment to deploy such a defense. A considerable amount of money is provided in the budget for improving the forces now on hand.

Air Defense Priority

It is assumed that the Soviets are making at least as heavy an effort as we are in the anti-missile field, and perhaps heavier. They have always put a bigger share of their resources into air defense than the United States has judged appropriate for its defense needs, and put less effort than the United States into offensive systems.

The obvious area for Soviet efforts to upgrade the quality of their missile defense force is in hardening and dispersing missile sites. This would probably include the development of compact intermediate-range warheads, which allow smaller missiles that are easier to protect either through mobility or by protected underground installation. Such warhead development can be achieved through underground tests permitted under the test ban treaty.

Even before the effort was stepped up after the Kennedy Administration took office, the United States was taking steps along similar lines. They reflected the realization that the most important thing about a nuclear deterrent was not its overall size, but the assurance national leaders—and enemy leaders—could have that a significant part of it could survive an enemy strike. United States leaders have long assumed that it would only be a matter of time before the Soviets recognized the importance of such a guarantee. McCone's emphasis on qualitative improvements in the Soviet forces indicates that assumption was well founded.

Other Improvements

Other qualitative improvements that the United States has been stressing, and perhaps are now attracting Soviet attention, include:

- Retargetting capabilities for missiles. This allows a major increase in effectiveness for a given size missile force by reducing the number of missiles that need be committed to a target to provide assurance of destruction.
- Advanced reconnaissance techniques. Examples are the A-11 supersonic plane now on order for the United States, and various sorts of self-reporting devices on missiles to tell whether they have probably hit their targets. This information can then be fed to the retargettable missiles, so that second missiles will not be wasted on targets that are already destroyed.
- Improving missile accuracy. This is more important than warhead size on hard military targets.
- Penetration aids to counter anti-missile defenses, should the enemy deploy them.
- Plus a wide range of conventional force improvements, such as the TFX adjustable-wing fighter-bomber aircraft missiles.